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WHEN IS A WILLFUL BREACH "WILLFUL"?
THE LINK BETWEEN DEFINITIONS
AND DAMAGES
Richard Craswell*
The existing literature on willful breach has not been able to define
what should count as "willful." I argue here that any definition we
adopt has implications for just how high damages should be raised
in those cases where a breach qualifies as willful. As a result, both
of these issues-the definition of "willful," and the measure of
damages for willful breach-need to be considered simultaneously.
Specifically, if a definition of "willful" excludes all breachers who
behaved efficiently, then in theory we can raise the penalty on the
remaining inefficient breachers to any arbitrarily high level ("throw
the book at them"). But if, instead, a given definition of willful
would catch even some efficient breachers in its net, the damages
assessed against willful breachers should be more limited. In that
case, damages for willful breach might still justifiably be raised, but
they should be raised only to the level that is economically efficient.
INTRODUCTION
Liability for breach of contract is often described as a form of strict li-
ability, in which the measure of damages is unaffected by the culpability of
the breach. However, courts sometimes do award higher damages, under
various legal doctrines, if the behavior of the breacher seems especially cul-
pable.' When they do, they may describe the breacher's behavior using
labels such as willfully, or in bad faith, or fraudulently, or maliciously--or,
as Dickens once put it, "otherwise evil-adverbiously.
' 2
Unfortunately, labels like these are not self-defining. Over fifty years
ago, Corbin was scathingly critical of their use:
* William F. Baxter-Visa International Professor of Law, Stanford University. With
thanks for helpful comments from (most recently) Barry Adler, Curtis Bridgeman, Christine Jolls,
Ariel Porat, Eric Posner, and Alan Schwartz. Prior incarnations of this Article benefited from the
comments of a great number of people, including the participants in this Symposium and in semi-
nars at the American Law & Economics Association and the Harvard, McGill, Northwestern, and
Stanford law schools.
I. For a survey of the relevant doctrines, see Patricia H. Marschall, Willfullness: A Crucial
Factor in Choosing Remedies for Breach of Contract, 24 Amiz. L. REV. 733 (1982).




The word most commonly used is "wilful"; and it is seldom accompanied
by any discussion of its meaning or classification of the cases that should
fall within it. Its use indicates a childlike faith in the existence of a plain
and obvious line between the good and the bad, between unfortunate virtue
and unforgivable sin.'
In this Article, I make three claims. First, I argue that willful breaches
cannot be defined merely by reference to the breacher's mental state, and
that (as a result) the existing literature on willful breach lacks an adequate
definition of "willful." Second, I argue that any definition of "willful" we
adopt will have important implications for just how high damages should be
raised in those cases where a breach qualifies as willful, so that both of these
issues-the definition of "willful," and the measure of damages for willful
breach-should be considered simultaneously. Third, I argue that these is-
sues also require consideration of the fact-finding demands that each choice
would place on courts.
I. DEFINING A "WILLFUL" BREACH
I begin with the problem of defining "willful." One natural interpretation
of that term links it to the defendant's mental state: willful breaches are
knowing or intentional breaches.4
The problem with this definition is that adjectives like "knowing" and
"intentional" (and their adverb forms, "knowingly" and "intentionally") are
most easily applied to specific actions. A breach, by contrast, is not an ac-
tion but a state of affairs. If I promise to deliver widgets to you by next
Tuesday, then I am in breach if Tuesday arrives and you have no widgets,
but your being widgetless on Tuesday is not itself an action. Your widgetless
state may be the result of an action, of course; but typically it is the result of
a whole sequence of actions: of all the things that were done (or not done) in
the days leading up to Tuesday. Thus, before we can apply tests like "know-
ingly" or "intentionally," we need to know the individual actions in that
sequence to which those terms should be applied.
To illustrate, consider two staples of the contracts curriculum: Jacob &
Youngs, Inc. v. Kent,' and Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co.6 In
Kent, a builder promised to use a particular brand of pipe to build a house;
in Peevyhouse, a mining company promised to make certain repairs to the
land after they finished mining the coal. The builder in Kent used the wrong
brand of pipe, apparently by accident; but the mining company in Peevy-
3. 5 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS 545 (1951). As this passage demon-
strates, we do not even have any consensus on spelling: "willful" and "wilful" are both common.
4. E.g., Marschall, supra note 1, at 733 (defining a willful breach as "a knowing breach by
a party not legally excused from performing, which is made for any primary purpose other than to
confer a benefit on the aggrieved party"). For a similar definition, see Wdliam S. Dodge, The Case
for Punitive Damages in Contracts, 48 DuKE L.J. 629, 651-52 (1999).
5. 129 N.E. 889 (N.Y. 1921).
6. 382 P.2d 109 (Okla. 1962).
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house decided the promised repairs would cost too much, so it simply re-
fused to make the repairs. Described in this way, Peevyhouse sounds
deliberate or willful, while the breach in Kent sounds accidental!
However, Kent can be characterized as a willful breach if we focus on
other events in the sequence. After all, as soon as the builder discovered his
mistake, he could have torn the house down and started over, this time using
the right brand of pipe. (Much of the pipe was in the interior walls and
foundations, and so could not be replaced without demolishing the house.)
The builder chose not to do this, for demolishing the house would have been
extremely expensive, but there is no question that this choice-the choice
not to demolish the house-was deliberate. Thus, if the intentionality of this
part of the sequence is what matters, Kent must be classified with Peevy-
house as a deliberate or willful breach.8 Granted, we can avoid this
characterization of Kent if we focus instead on the builder's earlier, uninten-
tional mistake about what brand of pipe was being installed. But why should
the intentionality of that event control our characterization of the breach,
rather than the intentionality of the subsequent decision not to tear down the
house and start over?
Indeed, if we are free to pick and choose which decision to focus on, the
breach in Peevyhouse was not necessarily willful. True, the coal company
deliberately chose not to repair the land once they learned how much it
would cost to do so. Under at least one reading of the facts, though, the coal
company originally thought there was sufficient coal near enough to the sur-
face that the promised repairs would have been relatively easy. As it turned
out, the coal was deeper and less plentiful, and this made the repairs more
expensive than they might have been.9 Thus, if we focus on the coal com-
pany's mistake about the coal, that event in the sequence looks just as
involuntary as the builder's mistake about the pipe. And if the answer is,
"the coal company should have known there was a risk it might be mis-
taken," why not say that the builder should also have known there was a risk
it might get the brand of pipe wrong?
The problem here is fundamental. In the vast majority of cases, the par-
ties to a contract do not intend to breach at the time they signed it. Instead,
they hope the contract will be performed as planned, but then something
else happens. Costs go up, or a better offer is found elsewhere, or work is
performed incorrectly, and what originally looked like a good deal becomes
less appealing to one party. Sometimes that party grits her teeth and per-
7. Consistent with this intuition, Marschall discusses Peevyhouse as a "willful" breach, and
appears to treat Kent as nonwillful. Marschall, supra note 1, at 750-51 (discussing Peevyhouse), 743
(discussing Kent) (1982). Peevyhouse is also assumed to be a "deliberate" breach in Lucian Arye
Bebchuk & I.P.L. Png, Damage Measures for Inadvertent Breach of Contract, 19 INT'L REV. L. &
ECON. 319, 319-20 (1999).
8. The only commentator I have found who even mentions this similarity between Peevy-
house and Kent is Carol Chomsky, Of Spoil Pits and Swimming Pools: Reconsidering the Measure
of Damages for Construction Contracts, 75 MINN. L. REv. 1445, 1449-50 (1991).
9. Judith L. Maute, Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co. Revisited: The Ballad of
Willie and Lucille, 89 Nw. U. L. REV. 1341, 1368-69, 1419-24 (1995).
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forms anyway, but the litigated cases are those in which she decides she will
not go through with the deal. If we look at the entire sequence of the defen-
dant's decisions, there will almost always be some that were deliberate, thus
potentially allowing us to classify the breach as willful. But there will also
usually be some events that were not deliberate-the increase in costs, or
the work that was done incorrectly, or the better offer that came along at the
last minute-so if we focus on that event, we will classify the breach as re-
sulting from an unintentional decision.
Indeed, even when breaches were in some sense intended from the be-
ginning, we can always (if we try) find nondeliberate events that played a
role. Consider a sleazy aluminum siding company that lures customers in by
quoting a very low price, planning all along to take their down payment and
disappear.' ° While this sounds like the quintessential example of a deliberate
breach, consider that even this company might have lived up to its contract
if, after the contract was signed, an eccentric millionaire had unexpectedly
offered it a reward for completing the job. Thus, even this breach can be
described as resulting from a sequence of two events: an earlier event that
was beyond the siding company's control (the failure of any millionaire to
offer a reward), followed by a later, deliberate decision about how to re-
spond to that event (the decision not to install the siding). Focusing on the
second of these events makes the breach seem deliberate-but if we focus
instead on the first event, it is hard to distinguish this example in any formal
way from cases like Kent or Peevyhouse.
Of course, quibbles like these do not stop most of us from condemning the
siding company's breach as "willful," even if we cannot articulate a formal
definition of that term. Apparently, in some cases (like my aluminum-siding
example) we naturally select the breacher's deliberate decisions to focus on,
and we see the resulting breach as willful. In other cases (perhaps Kent?), we
decide to focus instead on the chance event or the mistake, and see the breach
as accidental. Often, these choices are made without our being consciously
aware of them-though behavioral researchers are beginning to investigate
these choices more systematically, as I discuss below in Section I.B.
A. Analogies in Criminal Law
Viewed in these terms, the problem is not unique to contract law. A close
analogy can be found in criminal law, in cases where it matters whether the
defendant acted "voluntarily," and where the application of that label may
depend on our choice to focus on earlier or later events in the sequence that
led up to a crime. For example, a badly intoxicated driver may be literally
unable to control her car, so if we focus entirely on her actions while she is
behind the wheel, the resulting crash will seem involuntary. But if we look
instead at her earlier decisions (made while she was sober) to drive to a par-
10. In recent work, Ayres and Klass refer to this as an "insincere promise." IAN AYRES &
GREGORY KLASS, INSINCERE PROMISES: THE LAW OF ISREPRESENTED INTENT (2005); see also
George M. Cohen, The Fault Lines in Contract Damages, 80 VA. L. REv. 1225, 1252-56 (1994).
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ty where she intended to drink, and to do so without making any arrange-
ments for a designated driver, those decisions make the accident seem more
the result of a voluntary choice."
Criminal law must also deal with the problem of conditional intentions,
in cases where statutes impose longer sentences for crimes committed with
a particular intent. For example, if a prison inmate takes a hostage and
threatens to kill her unless he is released from prison, does this make the
inmate guilty of assault "with intent to kill"? Or is he guilty only of ordinary
assault, since he did not intend unconditionally to kill the hostage, and prob-
ably hoped he would not have to kill her? 2 This problem is at least
somewhat similar to trying to decide whether a breach of contract was inten-
tional if the contractor intended to perform unless it turned out to be too
expensive, or if the aluminum siding company intended to breach unless a
millionaire offered to reward it for performing. And while criminal law
scholars have not agreed on any general solution to this problem, they do
agree that characterizing a conditional intent is not simply a matter of dis-
covering some fact about what the defendant was actually thinking.'3
B. Lay Assessments of Culpability
Rather than looking for solutions in the theories of scholars, we might
instead look to laypeople's intuitive judgments about which actions qualify
as "intentional." As I noted earlier, few observers would hesitate to condemn
my aluminum siding company as a willful breacher, even after they under-
stand that the company would have been perfectly willing to perform if only
a millionaire had offered them a bribe. I can also report that my first-year
contracts students regularly (and, in most years, nearly unanimously) con-
sider the breach in Peevyhouse to be an intentional breach, but do not apply
that label to the breach in Kent.
Behavioral researchers have recently begun to study laypeople's assess-
ments of culpability when contracts are broken. While those studies have
not focused specifically on terms like "willful," some of their findings are
nevertheless of interest. For example, in one survey, lay subjects were asked
to assess brief descriptions of hypothetical cases in which the breaching firm
broke its contract either (a) to earn greater profits, when a better-paying op-
portunity arose elsewhere, or (b) to avoid suffering a loss, when the firm's
11. For a useful discussion of this issue in criminal law, see Mark Kelman, Interpretive Con-
struction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 STAN. L. REV. 591, 600-11 (1981). For an example of
a closely analogous problem in contract law, compare Commercial Discount Co. v. Town of Plain-
field, 180 A. 311, 313 (Conn. 1935) (decision by contractor to stop working, when the contractor was in
severe financial difficulties and was simply unable to pay its workers, held not to be a "willful" breach),
with Billigmeier v. Concorde Marketing, Inc., No. 04-01-324, 2001 WL 1530356, at *7 (Minn. Ct.
App. Dec. 4, 2001) (breach triggered by defendant's financial difficulties held to be "willful" when the
financial difficulties themselves were caused by the defendant's wrongful behavior).
12. Cf State v. Irwin, 285 S.E.2d 345, 349 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982) (reducing the verdict to
simple assault without intent to kill).
13. For a recent review of the controversy, see Gideon Yaffe, Conditional Intent and Mens
Rea, 10 LEGAL THEORY 273 (2004).
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costs of performance increased. Consistent with other work on heuristic dis-
tinctions between gains and losses, the subjects systematically tended to
judge the first kind of breach as the more culpable. 4 Other studies-though
not focusing on breach of contract in particular-found that subjects' will-
ingness to describe any given outcome as "intentional" varied depending on
whether they were judging the intentionality of normatively desirable behav-
ior, where they might be concerned with assigning credit; or whether they
were judging the intentionality of normatively undesirable behavior, where
they might be concerned with assigning blame. 5
While this research is promising, it is subject to several limits. For one
thing, the research is still at an early stage, so the patterns (if any) in lay
judgments about breach are still unclear. 6 Moreover, even if we could iden-
tify precisely which breaches most lay observers considered culpable, we
would still have to decide whether those lay judgments about culpability
ought to be endorsed and embodied in the law, or whether they should in-
stead be considered "heuristic errors" that the law should reject or try to
overcome. Obviously, the answer will depend in part on why we want to
single out willful breaches for extra punishment.
In this Article, though, I take no position on the question of why we
might want to single out certain breaches for extra punishment. There are of
course standard economic arguments for doing so, based mostly on the need
for additional deterrence if ordinary damages are too low; and there are
also standard noneconomic or moral arguments for extra punishment. 9
Rather than engage in either of those debates, I simply posit that we have
14. Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & Jonathan Baron, Moral Judgment and Moral Heuristics in
Breach of Contract, J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 19, on file with
author). Interestingly, in describing their results the authors at one point use the term "willful" to
characterize the first kind of breach (breach to gain greater profits) but not the second kind (breach
to avoid incurring losses). Id. (manuscript at 3).
15. For surveys of this literature, see Joshua Knobe, The Concept of Intentional Action: A
Case Study in the Uses of Folk Psychology, 130 PHIL. STUD. 203 (2006); Alfred R. Mele, Inten-
tional action: controversies, data, and core hypotheses, 16 PHIL. PSYCHOL. 325 (2003).
16. For another recent survey, also containing some intriguing results, see Steven Shavell, Is
Breach of Contract Immoral?, 56 EMORY L.J. 439 (2006). An earlier survey, though one less useful
for present purposes, can be found in David Baumer & Patricia Marschall, Willful Breach of Con-
tract for the Sale of Goods: Can the Bane of Business Be an Economic Bonanza?, 65 TEMPLE L.
REV. 159 (1992). Baumer and Marschall's questionnaire explicitly told respondents that the hypo-
thetical breach was "deliberate" and "willful," id. at 184, so their survey sheds no light on the
question of when respondents themselves would use those labels.
17. Wilkinson-Ryan & Baron are properly cautious on this point. See supra note 14 (manu-
script at 23). For varying views on the potential moral and legal relevance of lay heuristics generally,
see, for example, Cass R. Sunstein, Moral heuristics, 28 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCIENCEs 531 (2005); see
also John Mikhail, Moral heuristics or moral competence? Reflections on Sunstein, 28 BEHAV. &
BRAIN SCIENCEs 557 (2005).
18. E.g., Bruce Chapman & Michael Trebilcock, Punitive Damages: Divergence in Search of
a Rationale, 40 ALA. L. REV. 741, 805-08 (1989). For a more recent example, see Oren Bar-Gill &
Omri Ben-Shahar, An Information Theory of Willful Breach, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1479 (2009).
19. E.g., Chapman & Trebilcock, supra note 18, at 779-86; Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Could
Breach of Contract Be Immoral?, 107 MIH. L. REV. 1551 (2009).
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already decided (for some reason) that penalties ought to be higher for at
least some breaches.
C. Two Ways of Defining "Willful"
I do this in order to focus on the choice between two different methods
of raising damages, involving two different definitions of "willful." As I dis-
cuss below, these two methods correspond loosely to the difference between
negligence and strict liability in tort law. The first method, corresponding to
negligence, is one in which the only breaches that qualify as willful-and,
hence, the only breaches that are subject to extra damages-are those where
the breacher behaved inefficiently in some way. The second method, corre-
sponding to strict liability, is one in which even breachers who behaved
efficiently can be found to have committed a willful breach.
Obviously, the first method (the one corresponding to negligence) re-
quires courts to be able to tell whether a breacher behaved inefficiently, so
in that respect the first method is more demanding of courts. However, the
second method (the one corresponding to strict liability) requires courts to
calibrate the amount of the higher damages more precisely, so in that respect
the second method is more demanding. Table 1 summarizes these differ-
ences.
TABLE 1
DEMANDS PLACED ON THE COURTS
Definition of Evaluate the Breacher's Calibrate the Extra Damages
'Willful" Efficiency Precisely
Negligence Yes Less
Strict liability No More
II. THE ANALOGY TO NEGLIGENCE
A. Defining a Negligence Regime
Consider first a legal regime in which the label "willful" is applied, and
higher damages are awarded, only when the breacher behaved inefficiently
in some way. Under this regime, breachers who behaved efficiently would
still be liable for ordinary contract damages, whatever ordinary damages are
taken to be. In that respect, it differs from negligence regimes in tort law,
where defendants who are not negligent pay no damages at all. But the re-
gime I describe is still analogous to a negligence regime in torts, in that (1)
it requires courts to evaluate the defendant's behavior, and (2) defendants
whose behavior was inefficient are then subjected to harsher legal conse-
quences. In this case, the harsher consequence is that defendants who are
found to have behaved inefficiently must pay the extra measure of damages
charged against willful breachers.
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More specifically, a negligence regime (as I use the term here) depends
on the law as it is actually applied, not on its black-letter doctrine. For ex-
ample, even if the law were to explicitly define "willful" to mean "resulting
from inefficient behavior," that would not qualify as a negligence regime
unless it actually succeeded, in practice, in imposing extra damages only on
those breachers who behaved inefficiently. As will become clear below, the
economic effects of any definition depend on what courts actually do, not on
what black-letter doctrine says they do.
I should also clarify that, when I speak of breachers behaving ineffi-
ciently, I intend to include more than just inefficient breach. In Kent, the
builder's final decision not to rebuild the house (once the mistake with the
pipe was discovered) probably was not inefficient, as the value to the buyer
of replacing the pipe was surely less than the high cost of doing so. But even
if that decision was efficient, the builder might still have made an inefficient
decision at an earlier stage-for example, when it decided how many pre-
cautions to take in checking each shipment of pipe. A regime that imposed
extra damages on builders who made an inefficient decision at the precau-
tion stage would still be a negligence regime, as I use that term.
Indeed, since most breaches result from an entire sequence of events,
there are usually any number of decisions that might have been inefficient.
In some cases, the charge might be that the breacher had failed to efficiently
investigate the potential risks before agreeing to perform the contract.' ° In
others, a breacher who had adequately investigated the risks might neverthe-
less be accused of failing to disclose those risks to its contracting partner, if
circumstances would have made such disclosures efficient.2' If the risk of
not being able to perform was sufficiently high (as in my aluminum siding
example), and if that risk was not adequately disclosed to the other party, it
might then be argued that it was inefficient for the breacher to offer the con-
tract in the first place." Inefficiencies might also be alleged with respect to
the breacher's litigation behavior, if (for example) the breacher raised frivo-
lous legal claims whose likelihood of success was too low to justify the
costs of litigating them."
In short, there are many possible ways in which any given breacher
might have behaved inefficiently. A negligence regime, as I use that term, is
one in which the only breaches that are deemed willful (in actual practice)
are ones in which the breacher behaved inefficiently in one or more of these
ways.
20. For a mathematical model of the efficient level of risk investigation, see Richard Cras-
well, Precontractual Investigation as an Optimal Precaution Problem, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 401
(1988). For a prose analysis, asserting a different conclusion about the measure of damages that
would create optimal incentives to investigate, see Cohen, supra note 10, at 1245-46.
21. I discuss the potential costs and benefits of disclosing additional information in Richard
Craswell, Taking Information Seriously: Misrepresentation and Nondisclosure in Contract Law and
Elsewhere, 92 VA. L. REv. 565 (2006).
22. For a more detailed analysis, see AvREs & KLAsS, supra note 10, at 31-42.
23. For a possible example, see the allegations of "bad faith breach" in Seaman's Direct
Buying Service, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 686 P.2d 1158, 1167 (Cal. 1984).
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B. "Willful" as a Test for Inefficiency?
It might seem unlikely that any test for willfulness could ever corre-
spond (in actual practice) to a judgment about the inefficiency of the
breacher's conduct. However, as long as the law has not resolved the defini-
tional problems discussed in Part I, it is difficult to rule out any of the
possible ways in which a willfulness test might be applied. For example, it
would not be implausible if a breach like the one in Kent was especially
likely to strike jurors as willful if the mistake with the pipe resulted from the
builder's choice to take an inefficiently low level of precautions in inspect-
24ing each pipe delivery. If jurors were less inclined to find willfulness in a
case where the builder took efficient precautions and merely got unlucky,
that tendency would move the law in the direction of a negligence regime.
On the other hand, even if a legal test for culpability were explicitly de-
fined in terms of the inefficiency of the breacher's behavior, these same
definitional problems might make it hard to know how that test was actually
applied. Consider the following definition of "opportunistic" breaches, from
a Seventh Circuit case in which punitive damages had been sought: "Not all
breaches of contract are involuntary or otherwise efficient. Some are oppor-
tunistic; the promisor wants the benefit of the bargain without bearing the
agreed-upon cost, and exploits the inadequacies of purely compensatory
remedies ....,,
This passage contrasts "opportunistic" with "efficient," suggesting (per-
haps) that efficient breaches should never be labeled opportunistic. But the
passage also says that opportunistic breaches exploit the inadequacies of
normal contract damages, and the word "exploit" is itself difficult to define.
Suppose, for example, that ordinary contract damages are inadequate in a
particular case; but suppose that the breacher behaved efficiently in every
possible respect. Is this efficient breacher nevertheless "exploiting" the in-
adequacy of ordinary damages, since she is getting away without paying the
full costs of her breach? Or is she not really exploiting that inadequacy at
all, because by behaving efficiently she has acted exactly as she would have
acted even if ordinary damages had been adequate?
26
24. The dissenting judge in Kent, who would have awarded higher damages, seems to have
held something close to this view, for he described that breach as "either intentional or due to gross
neglect which, under the uncontradicted facts, amounted to the same thing .... Jacob & Youngs,
Inc. v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889, 892 (N.Y. 1921) (McLaughlin, J., dissenting). For a similar view, see
Robert E. Scott, In (Partial) Defense of Strict Liability in Contract, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1381, 1383-
87 (2009). Unfortunately, neither Judge McLaughlin nor Professor Scott discusses the costs or the
likely benefits of additional precautions, and this makes it hard to judge whether a higher level of
precautions would in fact have been efficient.
25. Patton v. Mid-Continent Systems, Inc., 841 F.2d 742, 751 (7th Cir. 1988). A somewhat
similar definition has been proposed in the draft of the Third Restatement of Restition and Unjust
Enrichment. RESTATEMENT (TreaD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39 (Tentative
Draft No.4, 2008). However, that section does not contain any explicit suggestion that efficient
breaches could not be opportunistic, and its proposed comment i strongly suggests the opposite.
26. Note, too, that the quoted passage also contrasts opportunistic breaches with "involun-
tary" breaches. Defining a voluntary breach raises the same problems already discussed in
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C. The Demands that Negligence Makes of Courts
Obviously, it will often be difficult for courts to evaluate the efficiency
of a breacher's decisions. Indeed, this difficulty is closely akin to the diffi-
culty of evaluating a tortfeasor's decisions in a typical negligence case,
which is why I have borrowed the "negligence" label.
At the same time, though, negligence regimes may be less demanding of
courts with respect to the exact amount of the higher damages that are as-
sessed, in those cases where the breacher is found to have behaved
inefficiently and the breach is deemed willful. To be sure, the exact size of
the award is not completely irrelevant under negligence, for it is important
that the damages be high enough to deter the inefficient behavior. But as
long as the damages exceed that minimum, they can (in theory) be raised to
any arbitrarily high level-we can "throw the book at" the inefficient27
breachers, as Richard Posner has suggested -without producing overdeter-
rence or any other adverse economic effects. This is because negligence
rules, if they are accurately applied, offer a safe harbor for efficient breach-
ers: as long as the breacher is confident that she has behaved efficiently in
every respect, she should never have to worry about liability for extra dam-
ages. As a result, those extra damages can be set at any arbitrarily high level
without inducing efficient breachers to further alter their behavior or their
prices. While this feature of negligence rules has not been emphasized in the
contracts literature, the same point has often been made in connection with
tort law.2
The catch, however, is that courts have to be able to identify efficient
behavior perfectly in order to avoid any adverse effects from arbitrarily high
damage awards. Moreover, it is not enough if courts are always able to make
perfect decisions with hindsight, after a case has come to trial. To avoid ad-
verse effects, potential defendants must be able to know in advance what
kind of behavior will be judged inefficient by the courts, and hence sub-
jected to larger penalties. Such certainty is difficult to achieve in the real
world, especially if the legal criteria for higher damages are defined in such
vague terms as willful.
29
connection with tests like "intentional" or "knowing," since most breaches result from a sequence
consisting of both voluntary and involuntary events.
27. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 119 (7th ed. 2007).
28. See especially Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1523 (1984).
For discussions of the analogous point in connection with punitive damages, see Chapman & Trebil-
cock, supra note 18, at 806-08; Keith N. Hylton, Punitive Damages and the Economic Theory of
Penalties, 87 GEO. L.J. 421 (1998).
29. For similar concerns, see Mark Gergen, A Cautionary Tale About Contractual Good
Faith in Texas, 72 TEx. L. REV. 1235, 1258 (1994); Nicholas J. Johnson, The Boundaries of Extra-
compensatory Relief for Abusive Breach of Contract, 33 CONN. L. REV. 181, 197 (2000); Barry
Perlstein, Crossing the Contract-Tort Boundary: An Economic Argument for the Imposition of Ex-
tracompensatory Damages for Opportunistic Breach of Contract, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 877, 889-90
(1992); and Alan 0. Sykes, "Bad Faith" Breach of Contract by First-Party Insurers, 25 J. LEGAL
STUD. 405,438-39 (1996).
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III. THE ANALOGY TO STRICT LIABILITY
Accordingly, I turn now to regimes in which even breachers who behave
efficiently still face some risk that their breaches will be deemed willful, and
that they will be made to pay extra damages. As before, the key for my pur-
poses is how such a regime is applied in practice, not what formal label the
law adopts. Thus, I include here not just regimes that explicitly define "will-
ful" in a way that applies to efficient breachers, but also regimes that purport
to adopt a narrower standard but whose judges or juries apply that standard
inaccurately in some cases, so that efficient breachers are sometimes erro-
neously subjected to higher damages. In this sense, my classification is
meant to be all-inclusive: any regime that does not qualify as a negligence
regime (as defined in the previous section) will qualify as a strict liability
regime.
Obviously, strict liability regimes reduce the demands on courts in one
respect, since courts need no longer be accurate in evaluating the efficiency
of the breacher's behavior. Indeed, strict liability regimes can (in theory)
dispense with the need for any evaluation whatsoever of the efficiency of the
breacher's behavior. To be sure, these regimes may still have to decide on
some other grounds whether the breacher's behavior was willful (if it is only
willful breaches that are subjected to the extra damages), and what that en-
tails will depend on what definition of "willful" the law adopts. Still, as long
as that definition does not require courts to evaluate the efficiency of the
breacher's behavior (as I am assuming now), that will ease courts' task in
one respect.
On the other hand, strict liability regimes increase the demands on
courts with respect to the exact amount of the higher damage awards, for it
now becomes important that the damage awards be neither too low nor too
high. Damages that are too high are not a concern under negligence regimes,
because efficient breachers would never have to pay those damages any-
way.3° But strict liability regimes (by definition) take away this safe harbor
for breachers who behave efficiently, with the result that any increase in the
higher damage awards will affect the behavior of even efficient breachers.
To be sure, this effect on breachers might be good if the normal contract
damages would otherwise be too low, and if the higher awards merely move
the total damages closer to whatever level is optimal. But if the higher
awards go too high-more precisely, if they go beyond the level of damages
that is optimal, in a sense that I define below-then a strict liability regime
must worry that the larger awards will cause breachers to modify their be-
havior excessively. This can lead to overdeterrence, higher prices, and other
undesirable effects.
30. See supra text preceding note 27.
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A. The Cost of Excessive Awards Under Strict Liability
This last point may require further explanation, because some writers
assume that the only economic argument against large damage remedies is
that they would deter efficient breaches." These writers then note (correctly)
that the threat of large awards should not block an efficient breach if the
parties can renegotiate, for if performance is truly inefficient then the poten-
tial breacher should always be able to buy her way out of the contract. They
conclude, as a result, that there should be no economic objection to higher
damage awards as long as renegotiation costs are low."
What this analysis misses, however, is that the threat of higher damages
will raise the price the potential breacher must pay in any subsequent rene-
gotiation, and this can have further efficiency effects.33 At a minimum, it
makes such contracts less attractive to some parties-for example, builders
will then face the risk of having to make a larger payment if and when they
make a serious mistake, so they will probably have to raise the price of their
houses to cover that increased liability risk. Builders may also take extra
precautions to reduce the risk of making a mistake-for example, a builder
may now find it worthwhile to instruct two employees rather than one to
double-check every shipment of pipe-if a mistake will now put them in the
position of having to make an even larger payment, because of the threat of
larger damage awards.3 To be sure, these may be good effects rather than
bad ones, for there is some value (up to a point) in having builders take pre-
cautions. At some point, though, if the threatened payment becomes large
enough, the builder will have an incentive to take too many precautions, so
the legal rule will produce costs rather than benefits. In short, strict liability
can produce good effects if damages are increased up to the optimal level,
but no further.35
More precisely, in a strict liability regime it will not matter if damage
awards are randomly too high or too low, so long as the average or expected
value of those awards is at the optimal level.36 But a regime of strict liability
does require that the expected damage award be optimal, in order to give
potential breachers just the right incentives to modify their behavior. Thus,
when it comes to the exact measure of damages that is assessed against will-
31. See, e.g., 3 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 12.17a, at 294 (3d
ed. 2004); Marschall, supra note 1, at 736-38.
32. E.g., Dodge, supra note 4, at 665-78; Marschall, supra note 1, at 737-39.
33. For a more detailed discussion of these effects, see Richard Craswell, Contract Reme-
dies, Renegotiation, and the Theory of Efficient Breach, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 629 (1988).
34. Id. at 646-47; see also Robert Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model
of Precaution, 73 CAL. L. REv. 1, 11- 19 (1985).
35. See Cooter, supra note 27, at 1532-37.
36. More precisely, optimal deterrence can be achieved as long as the damage award that
defendants expect, at the time they choose their actions, is the same as the amount of harm that
defendants expect their actions to cause. This condition will be satisfied if both courts and defen-
dants are accurate on average. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Accuracy in the Assessment of
Damages, 39 J.L. & ECON. 191, 199-200 (1996).
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ful breachers, strict liability regimes make greater demands on courts than
negligence regimes do.
B. Optimal Damages Under Strict Liability
In response, it is sometimes suggested that determining the optimal
damage measure (under strict liability) must be easier than judging the effi-
ciency of the breacher's behavior (under negligence). 3 7 After all, if the
optimal damage award is exactly compensatory, we can calculate it by
knowing only the costs inflicted by the breacher's behavior, but to evaluate
the actual efficiency of the breacher's behavior, we usually need to know
both its costs and its benefits. However, there are many cases in which the
optimal damage award will not be exactly compensatory, so calculating the
optimal award will require courts to know more than just the amount of the
nonbreacher's loss.
In some cases, awards that are less than compensatory can improve effi-
ciency. For example, if the nonbreacher has more control over some aspects
of the loss, either by mitigating damages after the breach or by taking pre-
cautions of his own beforehand, it could be better to award a smaller amount
in order to improve the nonbreacher's incentives to control those losses effi-
ciently.3" Smaller awards might also be more efficient if the nonbreacher is
less risk-averse than the breacher,39 or if the loss is a nonmonetary one that
nonbreachers prefer not to insure against,4° or if the nonbreachers differ in
their susceptibility to damages in ways that the breacher cannot reflect by
charging them a different price.4' In some cases, smaller awards might also
be a more efficient way of optimizing various incentives at the precontrac-
tual stage,41 or of reducing problems caused by potentially judgment-proof
defendants. 43 And if the size of the award affects the number of lawsuits that
are brought (as seems likely), the resulting effect on litigation costs could
also reduce the size of the optimal award." Identifying the award that best
37. See, e.g., STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 9 (1987).
38. A similar point is made by AYRES & KLASS, supra note 10, at 71-72. See also Saul Lev-
more, Stipulated Damages, Super-Strict Liability, and Mitigation in Contract Law, 107 MICH. L.
REV. 1365, 1367-70 (2009); Ariel Porat, A Comparative Fault Defense in Contract Law, 107 MICH.
L. REV. 1397, 1400-01 (2009).
39. See A. Mitchell Polinsky, Risk Sharing through Breach of Contract Remedies, 12 J.
LEGAL STUD. 427, 433-36 (1983).
40. Samuel A. Rea, Jr., Nonpecuniary Loss and Breach of Contract, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 35,
41-45 (1982).
41. Gwyn D. Quillen, Note, Contract Damages and Cross-Subsidization, 61 S. CAL. L. REV.
1125 (1988).
42. Craswell, supra note 20.
43. James Boyd & Daniel E. Ingberman, Do Punitive Damages Promote Deterrence? 19
INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 47 (1999).
44. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, The Welfare Implications of Costly Litiga-
tionfor the Level of Liability, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 151 (1988).
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balances all of these factors would challenge an expert economist, much less
an ordinary judge or jury.
To complicate matters further, in some cases the optimal award might be
larger than the above analysis might suggest, possibly even larger than
strictly compensatory damages." Among other possible justifications, if
there is some chance that a breacher might escape having to pay damages at
all, that could reduce the deterrent effect of any given award. A common
recommendation in these cases is to multiply whatever award would other-
wise be optimal by one over the probability that the award will actually be46
assessed. But this solution requires courts to be able to determine what that
probability is, thus increasing the informational demands in one respect.
47
Moreover, in most cases the optimal solution will not involve a "simple"
correction like multiplying the damages by one over the probability of pun-
ishment. Though the point has not been widely recognized, that solution
creates incentives for optimal decisions at the margin only under a few spe-
41cial conditions that rarely hold in real legal institutions. Specifically, that
multiplier will be optimal only (1) if the probability of punishment is the
same for all breachers, regardless of the harmfulness of their breach, or (2)
if the multiplier is adjusted individually case by case, to reflect the probabil-
ity of punishment faced by each individual breacher. The first condition
almost never holds, because more harmful breaches cause greater damages
and thus are more likely to trigger a lawsuit; and if there is any dispute
about the underlying liability, more harmful breaches are probably more
likely to be judged a breach. Moreover, the second condition requires that
the harshest penalties be imposed on those breachers who committed the
least harmful breaches (since those are the ones least likely to be held li-
able), which is exactly the opposite of how most punitive sanctions are used.
Instead, under more plausible assumptions about real-world enforce-
ment, imperfect enforcement can lead either to underdeterrence or to
overdeterrence-implying that the optimal adjustment may require either
increasing or decreasing the size of the damage award. 49 As a result, it may
be even harder for courts to identify the damage award that would be exactly
optimal.
45. Aaron S. Edlin & Alan Schwartz, Optimal Penalties in Contracts, 78 CHI-KENT L. REV.
33 (2003).
46. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 11
HARV. L. REV. 869 (1998).
47. Alan Schwartz, The Myth that Promisees Prefer Supracompensatory Remedies: An Anal-
ysis of Contractingfor Damage Measures, 100 YALE L.J. 369, 401-03 (1990).
48. I discuss this issue at more length in Richard Craswell, Deterrence and Damages: The
Multiplier Principle and Its Alternatives, 97 MICH. L. REv. 2185 (1999).
49. For a formal analysis of the factors that are likely to lead to overdeterrence or underde-
terrence under conditions of uncertainty, see SHAVELL, supra note 37, at 93-99; Richard Craswell &
John E. Calfee, Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards, 2 J. L. EcON. & ORG. 279 (1986).
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CONCLUSION
In short, Corbin was right,50 and defining "willful" is harder than it
might appear. In this Article, I have tried to expand on Corbin's remarks in
three ways. First, the existing literature has not yet developed any adequate
definition of "willful," mostly because it has not addressed the question of
which event in the sequence leading up to the breach should be assessed for
deliberateness or intentionality.
Second, the desirability of any particular definition cannot be judged
without simultaneously considering the measure of damages that will be
applied to those breaches picked out by the definition, because different
definitions of "willful" have different implications for the amount of extra
damages that ought to be assessed. Specifically, definitions of "willful" that
reach only inefficient breachers can be paired with damage awards that are
quite high, and do not need to be calibrated very precisely; but definitions of
"willful" that include efficient breachers will require damage awards that are
more restrained. As a result, the real task is to choose a pair of policies-
that is, a combination of a definition of "willful" and a measure of dam-
ages-rather than trying to choose a definition of "willful" in isolation.
Third, and finally, each pair of policies that we might choose makes dif-
ferent demands on the courts. Some policies require courts to be good at
evaluating the breacher's behavior, while others require courts to be good at
identifying the optimal level of damages. If the legal rules are chosen wise-
ly, one or the other of these tasks can be de-emphasized, either by moving
toward strict liability (thus sparing courts from having to evaluate the
breacher's behavior) or by moving toward negligence (thus freeing courts
from having to calibrate the measure of damages precisely). But there is no
way to free courts from both tasks simultaneously, so they will have to at-
tend to one or the other.
50. See the passage quoted supra at note 3.
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